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FOREWORD: BREWER V. WILLIAMS-A
HARD LOOK AT A DISCOMFITING RECORD*
YALE KAMISA**
Resistance to the disclosure of [incriminating] information is
considerably increased ... if something is not done to
establish a friendly and trusting attitude on the part of the
subject. Once rapport is established, you have begun the
"yes" attitude. The following devices are recommended:
... Establish confidence and friendliness by talking for a
period about everyday subjects. In other words, have a
"friendly visit."
-The Gentle Art of Inter-
viewing and Interrogation'
I told [Mr. Williams his rights]. I further added [that] you
and I both know that you are represented by counsel here
[in Davenport and] in Des Moines....
I then further advised him that I wanted him to be sure to
remember what I had just told him because it was a long
ride back to Des Moines and he and I would be visiting.
-Captain Leaming, chief
of detectives, Des Moines
Police Department2
In recent decades, few matters have split the Supreme Court,
troubled the legal profession, and agitated the public as much as the
*This article turned out to be entirely different from the one that I had planned to write. I was
about halfway through the article I originally intended to write, one appraising the various
opinions in Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977), in light of Massiah v. United States, 377
U.S. 201 (1964), Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96
(1975), when I dipped into the record to clarify one point. I never got back out. I found the record
contradictory, bewildering, and at times nothing less than flabbergasting. This article is the
result. It more or less "wrote itself," but any mistakes are mine.
The writing of this article was greatly aided by the excellent Supreme Court brief written by
respondent Williams' court appointed counsel, Professor Robert D. Bartels of the University of
Iowa College of Law. It should be emphasized that Professor Bartels did not try the case. He did
not enter the picture until Williams sought federal habeas corpus relief.
**Professor of Law, University of Michigan; A.B. 1950, New York University; LL.B. 1954,
Columbia University.
1. F. ROYAL & S. ScHuTr, GENTLE ART OF INTERVIEWING AND INTERROGATION 61-62 (1976).
2. Brief for Petitioner, Joint App. at 75, Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
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police interrogation-confession cases. The recent case of Brewer v.
Williams3 is as provocative as any, because the Supreme Court there
revdrsed the defendant's conviction for the "savage murder of a small
child" even though no Justice denied his guilt,4 he was warned of his
rights no fewer than five times, 5 and any "interrogation" that might
have occurred seemed quite mild.6
On Christmas Eve, 1968, a ten-year-old girl, Pamela Powers,
disappeared while with her family at the Des Moines, Iowa, YMCA.7 It
later turned out, as feared, that she had been raped and murdered. 8
Suspicion soon focused on defendant Williams, an escapee from a
mental institution and a deeply religious person or, to put it more
3. 430 U.S. 387 (1977). Although Williams raises questions that will long be debated, one
issue has already been resolved. Chief Justice Burger doubted that a successful retrial of
Williams "is realistically possible." Id at 416 n.1 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). On the other hand,
Justice Marshall "doubted very much that there is any chance a dangerous criminal will be
loosed on the streets, the bloodcurdling cries of the dissents notwithstanding." Id. at 408-09
(Marshall, J., concurring). Williams has since been retried and reconvicted of first-degree
murder. Des Moines Register, July 16, 1977, §A, at 1, col. 1. He was resentenced to life
imprisonment. Id, Aug. 20, 1977, §B, at 12, col. 4. In a ruling prior to Williams' second trial,
the court held that evidence of the discovery of the girl's body was admissible because of the
likelihood that the body would have been discovered even without Williams' statements. Y.
KAjmi.AR, W. LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIM1NAL PROCEDURE 170 (Supp. 1977).
4. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 416 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Williams never
confessed to the sexual molestation or slaying of the child. Des Moines Register, July 6, 1977,
§A, at 4, col. 1. At his second trial the defense admitted that Williams had carried the body out
of the YMCA building and had disposed of it but contended that the child had been sexually
assaulted and killed by someone else before being placed in Williams' room in the YMCA. Id.,
§A, at 1, col. 3. The defense claimed that because Williams was an escapee from a mental
institution and had previously molested children, he panicked when he found the body in his
room and decided to get rid of it immediately, hoping not to be implicated. Id., July 10, 1977,
§A, at 2, col. 1.
Because discovery rules had been liberalized since the first trial, defense lawyers received all
investigative reports on the murder, some of which indicated thait the police had considered the
possibility that the rapist-killer was sterile because the medical examiner who performed the
autopsy found semen, but no sperm, in the girl's body. Id., July 14, 1977, § A, at 3, col. 1. These
police reports had not been available to the defense at the first trial. Id. The defense maintained
that Williams was not sterile and that the child's killer had been, but medical experts disagreed
sharply over whether the frozen state of the little girl's body would have preserved any sperm
present in the body at the time of the murder. Id., July 12, 1977, §A, at 4, col. 5-6.
Although never mentioning his name at the trial (perhaps because the defense could
produce no evidence that he was sterile), id., July 9, 1977, §A, at 3, col. 3, the defense raised
questions concerning the possibility that the killer might have been Albert Bowers, a former
janitor of the building assigned to clean the YMCA washrooms on the day the child apparently
was abducted from a washroom. Bowers was killed in a car accident some three years after the
first trial and six years before the second. Id., July 6, 1977, §A, at 11, col. 3. According to the
defense, Bowers had a history of sexual molestations.
5. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 384, 416 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
6. See text accompanying notes 41-42 infra.
7. 430 U.S. at 390.
8. Brief for Petitioner at 4, Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
210
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aptly, "a young man with quixotic religious convictions." 9 A warrant
was issued for his arrest on a charge of "child-stealing." 1 ° Williams,
who had fled the state, telephoned a Des Moines lawyer named
McKnight and on the attorney's advice surrendered himself to the
Davenport, Iowa, police.
Two Des Moines detectives- Captain Leaming, chief of detectives
and a nineteen-year veteran of the Des Moines Police Department,
and Detective Nelson, a member of the homicide squad and a fifteen-
year veteran of the force-arranged to drive the 160 miles to
Davenport, pick up Williams, and return him directly to Des Moines."
Before being driven back to Des Moines, Williams was advised of his
right to remain silent many times: by a Davenport police officer,
Lieutenant Ackerman; by the Davenport judge who arraigned him on
the child-stealing warrant; by McKnight; by Captain Leaming himself;
and by a local Davenport attorney named Kelly.' 2 Williams also
asserted his rights many times: he requested and was granted a
"private audience" with the Davenport judge; 13 after his first meeting
with his Davenport lawyer, the lawyer informed the Davenport police
that his client did not want to talk to the police until he met with his
Des Moines lawyer;' 4 after Learning advised him of his rights, Williams
asked to meet alone with the Davenport lawyer and was allowed to do
so;15 when Leaming was about to put handcuffs on him and start the
journey back, Williams again asked to confer alone with his lawyer and
again his request was granted;16 and on the trip back to Des Moines he
told Captain Leaming several times that he would tell him "the whole
story after I see McKnight" back in Des Moines.'"
9. 430 U.S. at 412 (Powell, J., concurring).
10. Brief for Petitioner, Joint App. at 24-25.
11. Id. at 25, 37-38, 53, 60, 97.
12. See id- at 42 (Lieutenant Ackerman testifying that Williams was warned of his rights when
arrested); id. at 45 (Lieutenant Ackerman testifying that Williams conferred with Kelly, his
Davenport lawyer); id at 47 (Williams testifying that McKnight told him over the phone not to
answer any questions until he was in McKnight's presence); id. at 49-51 (Williams testifying that
he was advised of his rights by Lieutenant Ackerman and Judge Metcalf and that he conferred
with Kelly on several occasions); id. at 52 (Williams testifying that Kelly advised him to do his
talking when he got to his lawyer in Des Moines); id. at 75 (Captain Leaming testifying that he
advised Williams of his rights).
13. Id. at 50.
14. Id. at 44, 73.
15. Id. at 75 (testimony of Captain Learning).
16. Id. at 76 (testimony of Captain Learning).
17. Id. at 58, 61 (emphasis qdded) (testimony of Captain Learning); see id. at 60, 65 (same).
19771
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Captain Learning "theorized" I s that the child's body was buried in
the Mitchellville area, a suburb of Des Moines that he and his prisoner
would pass on the drive back. Because of bad weather and various
stops, the return trip to Des Moines .tookbetween five and six hours,19
and given the freezing rain, slippery roads, and some stops along the
way, the drive to the Mitchellville area probably took three or four
hours-plenty of time for a skilled interrogator to obtain a
confession.20
Both the trial court 2' and the federal district court 22 found, despite
Captain Leaming's testimony to the contrary, that defense attorney
McKnight and the Des Moines police agreed that Williams would not
be "questioned" until after he returned to Des Moines and conferred
with his lawyer.23 The federal district court found, also over Leaming's
18. Captain Learning knew that Williams had headed east and that some of the little girl's
clothing had been found in the Grinnell area about 50 miles east of Des Moines. The captain
"figured" that Williams "had probably got rid of the body as soon as he possibly could after he
left Des Moines." Id. at 65. That made Mitchellville, a town 10-15 miles east of Des Moines, a
strong possibility. Moreover, a search party had examined both the entire Grinnell area and the
Newton area (30 miles east of Des Moines) without finding the girl's body. So the captain
"theorized" or "figured Mitchellville." Id. at 61, 65, 93-94.
19. Id. at 48, 56, 93, 98.
20. This point is graphically illustrated by the 1963 congressional testimony of David
Acheson, then United States attorney for the District of Columbia:
[In some very high percentage of the cases a confession is made if it is going to be
made at all, within an hour or two, perhaps 3 hours after arrest. In the great
majority of cases a confession is made fairly promptly after arrest.... At the
present time for all practical purposes if [a suspect] can hold out for 2 hours, 2
hours, he is pretty well in the clear, but very few of them do.
Hearings on H.R 7525 and S. 486 Before the Senate Comm. on the District of Columbia, 88th
Cong., 1st Sess. 443 (1963).
21. Brief for Petitioner, Joint App. at 1-2.
22. Williams v. Brewer, 375 F. Supp. 170, 173, 176 (S.D. Iowa 1974). In the federal district
court both sides agreed that the case would be submitted on the trial court record without the
taking of further testimony. 1d. at 172. The federal court, however, made many more findings of
fact than had the state court.
23. Brief for Petitioner, Joint App. at 54, 78, 90. According to the record, in the course of a
long-distance phone conversation with Williams, McKnight told his client, in the presence of
Learning and his superior, Chief Nichols,that Williams would not be questioned about, and should
not reveal anything about, the case until he returned to Des Moines and conferred with his lawyer.
Id. at 38-40. Apparently both the trial court and federal district court concluded that by their
silence the Des Moines police "agreed" to "go along" with McKnight on this matter. The Williams
majority opinion, however, states that "[a]s a result of these [phone] conversations, it was agreed
between McKnight and the Des Moines police officials that Detective s] Learning and [Nelson]...
would not question [Williams] during the trip [back to Des Moines]." 430 U.S. at 391. But there is
no indication in the record that after McKnight concluded his phone conversation with Williams
anything was said by McKnight or by the Des Moines police aboutnot questioning Williams on the
return trip. The record does not show an explicit agreement or even that McKnight directly
instructed Chief Nichols or Captain Learning that Williams was notto be questioned on the return
trip. See also note 88 infra.
Captain Leaming not only denied that there was any agreement, he also denied hearing
McKnight tell Williams that he would not be questioned on the return trip. Brief for Petitioner,
HeinOnline  -- 66 Geo. L. J. 212 1977-1978
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denial,24 that Kelly requested and was refused permission to ride
along on the trip back to Des Moines 25 and that Kelly told the captain
that it was his understanding that Williams was not to be questioned
about the case until he met with his Des Moines lawyer.
26
Whether Learning "questioned" Williams on the long drive back to
Des Moines, whether Williams waived his rights, and what other
critical events occurred on that long drive turns on the captain's
Joint App. at 78, 90. Chief Nichols, however, who listened to McKnight's end of the phone
conversation along with Learning, did testify that he heard McKnight tell Williams that he would
not be questioned on the return trip and that Williams should not disclose anything about the
case until after he conferred with his lawyer back in Des Moines. Id. at 38-40. Presumably, this
conflict between the chief and the captain led the trial judge to observe that he was "not entirely
convinced" that Captain Leaming "testified with complete candor... regarding the 'agreement'
with Defendant's attorney." Id. at 2. The best interpretation of the record, I believe, is that the
chief simply expected or supposed or assumed that Captain Leaming would not try to elicit
incriminating information from Williams on the return trip-or that Williams would be so
"fortified" by advice from both his Davenport and Des Moines lawyers that there would be no
point in trying to do so. Id. at 40-41.
Kelly, Williams' Davenport lawyer, testified that he told the captain that "it was my
understanding that Mr. Williams was to be returned to... Des Moines and after his return... that
[McKnight] would talk to Williams in Leaming's office, and at that time he would reveal where the
body [child?] was." Id at 107. According to Kelly, Learning replied," 'This isn't quite the way I
understand it,'" and Kelly retorted that he thought his understanding of the arrangements
"should be carried out." Id- There is no indication in Kelly's testimony that Learning made any
response. Id. Because there is no indication in the record that Kelly had any communication with
McKnight, whatever Kelly knew about the agreement presumably came from Williams. Thus, if
any agreement had been struck between McKnight and the police after the Wiliams-McKnight
phone conversation, Kelly would have known no more about it than Williams.
Dissenting from the Eighth Circuit's ruling that Williams was entitled to a new trial, Judge
Webster commented, "I cannot but assume that the alleged 'broken promise' of Captain
Leaming is at the root of the result reached in this case." Williams v. Brewer, 509 F.2d 227, 237
(8th Cir. 1974). But "whatever its subliminal influence on the majority, the [Supreme Court's]
decision in WiUiams did not seem to turn on the police agreement." Y. KAMISAR. J. GRANO. & J.
HADDAD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 6.4550 (1977). Rather, it seemed to turn on the following:
Before Williams started for Des Moines, judicial proceedings had been initiated against him and
his right to the assistance of counsel had attached; he repeatedly asserted and exercised this
right and the Government failed to establish that he intentionally relinquished it during the
drive. 430 U.S. at 401, 404-06.
In his separate concurrence, however, Justice Stevens talked about the defendant "placlingl
his trust" in a lawyer who "in turn trusted the Iowa law enforcement authorities to honor a
committment made during negotiations which led to the apprehension of a potentially dangerous
person," and stressed that "if in the long run, we are seriously concerned about the individual's
effective representation by counsel, the State cannot be permitted to dishonor its promise to this
lawyer." Id. at 415. Assuming that the facts were as the state trial court and federal district court
findings evidently led Justice Stevens to believe, his viewpoint would be most forceful.
24. See Brief for Petitioners, Joint App. at 55 (Leaming denying that Kelly requested
permission to ride with him to Des Moines); id at 61,78,90 (Leaming denying that Kelly told him
not to question Williams during the ride back to Des Moines).
25. 375 F. Supp. at 173, 176.
26. Id.
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largely uncorroborated testimony.27 Williams sharply disputed the
captain on many points but, as might be expected, none of the courts
that passed on the case paid any attention to what he had to say.28 Yet
when the captain got into a controversy with Williams' Des Moines
attorney and into two more disputes with Williams' Davenport lawyer,
the federal district court disbelieved Leaming all three times.
To ask whether the disclosure made by Williams on the long drive
back should have been excluded is to ask not one question, but a
range of questions about Massiah v. United States,29 Miranda v.
Arizona, 3 0 and even the hoary "voluntariness" test. Yet none of these
questions can be answered without a careful examination of the record
27. Detective Nelson, who drove the car on the return trip to Des Moines while Learning and
Williams "visited" in the back seat, was unable to make out "much of the conversation" because
Williams "spoke so low." Brief for Petitioner, Joint App. at 101. He did, however, sharply
contradict Learning on one important point. Sometime before Williams announced that he was
going to reveal where the little girl's body was, Williams asked the captain whether the police
had found "a girl's shoes" or "her shoes."Id at 58, 81. When the captain replied that he did not
know, Williams (according to Learning) pointed to a Skelly station that could be seen from the
expressway and said that he had put the shoes there. Id. at 58-59, 82. Judge Webster, dissenting
from the Eighth Circuit's decision that Williams' disclosures should have been excluded,
maintained that Williams' question about the shoes was "triggered... by something [he] saw...
a filling station." Williams v. Brewer, 509 F.2d 227, 237 (8th Cir. 1974); see Brewer v. Williams,
430 U.S. 387, 433 (White, J., dissenting) (Williams asked about victim's clothing because he saw
gas station where he had concealed her shoes).
According to Detective Nelson, however, when Williams raised the question of the girl's shoes,
the filling station just off the Grinnell exit was not yet in view: "We hadn't come to Grinnell. We
were quite a ways away yet at that time." And "we asked Williams if the boots were with the
other articles and he stated no, they were behind a filling station.. .just off the exit to Grinnell."
Brief for Petitioner, Joint App. at 100. According to Nelson, he then asked Williams which
Grinnell exit to take and when Williams told him and they came upon two filling stations, he then
asked Williams which station was the one where he had put the shoes. Id. When Williams told
him, according to Nelson, he asked Williams where the boots would be if they were there. Id. The
filling station owner also testified that when Williams and the two detectives drove into his
station, one of the detectives asked Williams, "Now where did you put the boots at?" Id. at 72.
In short, according to Leaming-whose version seems to have been regarded by the courts as
the only version-Williams saw the filling station as they were driving along the freeway and led
the police from the freeway to the trash receptacle behind the filling station without being asked
a single question; Williams just "nodded his head, that station right over there as we were coming
along the freeway and at that time you could see it up there." Id. at 59. According to Nelson,
however, there was no station "right over there," and when Williams brought up the subject of
the shoes, the police asked at least four questions before Williams looked in the receptacle
behind the filling station.
28. But the Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Proceaure "directs the court to give weight to
the defendant's account in any factual dispute if it finds that the police department has not set
up procedures [full written records and sound recordings] to insure compliance with the Code or
has not diligently and in good faith sought to comply with the recordkeeping provisions." A
MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 130.4, Commentary at 343 (Official Draft,
1975) [hereinafter cited as MODEL CODE].
29. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
30. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
214
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in Brewer. Much attention has been devoted to the so-called
"Christian burial speech" that Captain Leaming delivered on the
return trip,31 but this approach focuses attention on a single snapshot
rather than a mural. The speech took no more than a minute or two.
What happened the rest of the time? What preceded the speech?
What did Learning tell Williams and how often and at what points
along the way? How did Williams respond? When? What did Williams
ask Leaming? When? How did Leaming respond, if at all? And if he
did, when? Everything hangs on the captain's version of the events.
THE RECORD EXAMINED
Captain Leaming's testimony is less clear than it ought to be as to
just when he rendered his now famous Christian burial speech. 32 The
best reading of the record, and one confirmed by the testimony of
Detective Nelson,3 3 who drove the car while Leaming and Williams
"visited" in the back,34 is that it occurred only a short time after they
left the Davenport area and entered the freeway. By that time,
according to Learning, he and his prisoner had already "discussed
religion ... intelligence of other people ... police procedures,
organizing youth groups, singing... playing an organ, and this sort of
thing. ' 3 According to Leaming, Williams "was very talkative ' 36 and
"a real good talker. ' 37 He must have also been a fast one to have
touched upon so many topics in the relatively few minutes that
elapsed between the time the Learning party left Davenport and the
time Leaming made the speech.
And now to the Christian burial speech itself. The United States
Supreme Court and four other courts pondered and dissected this
speech,38 yet, curiously, none of them discussed the fact that Captain
31. See text accompanying notes 41-42 infra.
32. Compare Brief for Petitioner, Joint App. at 63 (not very far out of Davenport on the way to
Des Moines) with id. at 81 (much discussion preceded the speech).
33. See id. at 104 (Nelson testifying that immediately after they got on the freeway, Leaming
asked Williams to think about revealing the location of the body).
34. See id. at 55, 75 (Captain Learning testifying that he reminded Williams of his Miranda
rights and that he was represented by counsel "because we'll be visiting between here and Des
Moines").
35. Id. at 81.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 87.
38. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 392-93 (1977) (quoting only from second version
without acknowledging that there is another version); id. at 431-32 (White, J., with Blackmun &
Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting) (same); Williams v. Brewer, 509 F.2d 227, 230 (8th Cir. 1974)
(same); id. at 235 (Webster, J., dissenting) (same); Williams v. Brewer, 375 F. Supp. 170, 174-75
(S.D. Iowa 1974) (same); State v. Williams, 182 N.W.2d 396, 403 (Iowa 1971) (quoting briefly
1977] 215
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Leaming offered two-and, in my judgment, two significantly
different-versions of it. The captain's first version was given on April
2, 1969, at a pretrial hearing to suppress evidence;"' his second
version, which was the only one quoted and discussed by the Supreme
Court and lower federal courts, was given at the trial held four weeks
later.40 Evidently, nobody noticed at the trial that the version Leaning
then gave differed in several respects from his earlier version. He was
not asked to explain any inconsistencies and did not do so. The two
versions, with related testimony, are set out below:
Second Version
I said to Mr. Williams, I said,
"Reverend, I'm going to tell you
something. I don't want you to
answer me, but I want you to
think about it when we're driving
down the road." I said, "I want
you to observe the weather. It's
raining and it's sleeting and it's
freezing. Visibility is very poor.
They are predicting snow for
tonight. I think that we're going
to be going right past where that
body is, and if we should stop
and find out where it is on the
way in, her parents are going to
be able to have a good Christian
burial for their little daughter. If
we don't and it does snow and if
you're the only person that
knows where this is and if you
have only been there once, it's
very possible that with show on
the ground you might not be able
to find it. Now I just want you to
think about that when we're
Eventually, as we were travel-
ing along there, I said to Mr.
Williams that, "I want to give
you something to think about
while we're traveling down the
road." I said, "Number one, I
want you to observe the weather
conditions, it's raining, it's sleet-
ing, it's freezing, driving is very
treacherous, visibility is poor,
it's going to be dark early this
evening. They are predicting
several inches of snow for to-
night, and I feel that you your-
self are the only person that
knows where this little girl's
body is, that you yourself have
only been there once, and if you
get a snow on top of it you
yourself may be unable to find it.
And, since we will be going right
past the area on the way into Des
Moines, I feel that we could stop
and locate the body, that the
parents of this little girl should
from first version without acknowledging that there is another version); id. at 407 (Stuart, J.,
dissenting) (quoting from second version without acknowledging that he is quoting from
different version than majority used).
39. Brief for Petitioner, Joint App. at 63.
40. Id. at 66, 81, 84.
First Version
216 [Vol. 66:201
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First Version Second Version
driving down the road." That's
all I said.
Q. About where were you when
you said that?
A. Well, not very far out of
Davenport. This is on the free-
way.
Q. And now when you got to
Mitchellville [the Mitchellville
turnoff was about 145 miles from
Davenport and about 10 to 15
miles outside of Des Moines],
did you ask him had he thought
about it?
A. No. As we were coming to-
wards Mitchellville, we'd still be
east of Mitchellville a ways, he
said to me, "How do [did?] you
know that [the body] would be at
Mitchellville?" And I said,
"Well, I'm an investigator. This
is my job, and I just figured it
out." I said, "I don't know
exactly where, but I do know it's
somewhere in that area." He
said, "You're right, and I'm
going to show you where it is."
41
be entitled to a Christian burial
for the little girl who was
snatched away from them on
Christmas [Elve and murdered.
And I feel we should stop and
locate it on the way in rather
than waiting until morning and
trying to come back out after a
snow storm and possibly not
being able to find it at all."
At that point Mr. Williams
asked me why I should feel that
we would be going right by it. I
told him that I knew it was some-
where in the Mitcheilville area
and I didn't know exactly where,
but I did know that it was
somewhere in the Mitchellville
area, and I felt that we should
stop and look.
I stated further, "I do not want
you to answer me. I don't want to
discuss it any further. Just think
about it as we're riding down the
road." [After testifying that they
stopped and got out to look for
the child's shoes (when Williams
asked whether they had been
found) and stopped again to look
for the blanket in which the child
had been wrapped (when Wil-
liams asked whether it had been
found), Captain Leaming con-
tinued:]
A. Well, we had further discus-
sions about people and religion
and intelligence and friends of
his, and what people's opinion
41. Id. at 63.
1977]
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Second Version
was of him and so forth. And, oh,
some distance still east of the
Mitchellville turn-off he said, "I
am going to show you where the
body is." He said, "How did you
know that it was by Mitchell-
vile?" I told him that this was
our job to find out such things
and I just knew that it was in that
area.
42
Each version of the Christian burial speech has aspects that are
more damaging to the prosecution than the other. For example, in the
first version Captain Leaming only says: "Ithink that we're going to be
going right past where that body is, and if we should stop and find out
where it is on the way in, her parents are going to be able to have a
good Christian burial for their little daughter. If we don't and it does
snow and if you [are] the only person that knows where this is ... "
(emphasis added). The second version, however, is a good deal more
powerful and emotional. This time the captain expresses his desires
and preference much more emphatically, and puts a heavier burden
on Williams: "I feel that you yourself are the only person that knows
where this little girl's body is .... And, since we will be going right past
the area ... I feel that we could stop and locate the body, that the
parents of this little girl should be entitled to a Christian burial for the
little girl who was snatched away from them on Christmas Eve and
murdered. And I feel we should stop and locate it on the way...
(emphasis added).
What on their face are merely words expressing a strong preference
for a certain course of action take on vivid color from the captain's
rank, badge, gun, and demeanor,43 from his standing as "a fine man"
(Williams' lawyer told him so) 44 and as a sensitive, religious person
42. Id. at 81-84.
43. Cf Foote, The Fourth Amendment: Obstacle or Necessity in the Law of Arrest?, in POLICE
POWER AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 29, 30 (C. Sowle ed. 1962) (discussing on-the-street
questioning by investigative officers). Professor Foote only deals with a situation in which an
officer stops a person on the street and questions him as to his identity and reason for being
where he is, a confrontation that falls short of a full-fledged arrest. But Williams was plainly
under arrest, plainly in custody, and thus experiencing additional coercion and anxiety.
44. Brief for Petitioner, Joint App. at 96 (testimony of- Captain Learning).
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'(Leaming himself told him so),45 and from Williams' probable
perception of Learning as his protector and sympathizer." Williams
was Leaming's prisoner and so far Leaming had been nice to him.
Williams would want very much to be nice to Learning. 47 Under the
second version of the speech on which all members of the Court
relied, Captain Learning had made his feelings perfectly clear to
45. Learning testified that shortly after they entered the freeway, he advised Williams that "I
myself had had religious training and background as a child, and that I would probably come
more near praying for him than I would to abuse him or strike him." Id at 80.
46. Attorney McKnight, who had accepted Leaming's offer to bring Williams back personally,
tried to reassure an obviously frightened Williams over the phone that Leaming was a "fine
man" who "won't let any harm come to you." Id. at 96. On the trip back, Williams expressed fear
that Learning wanted to kill him, and also that the state agents, who were following in a second
car in case the first vehicle slid off the icy roads, might want to kill him, too. Id. at 66, 80
(testimony of Captain Learning). Leaming assured Williams that he had no intentions of injuring
him in any way or "allowing anyone else to molest or abuse him in any manner while he was in
[his] custody." Id. at 80.
47. Even persons involved in much milder encounters with the police usually "desire to
appear courteous and not to offend. [Winterrogation is a social situation, and suspects respond
according to the normal rules of social interaction in such a situation." Griffiths & Ayres, A
Postscript to the Miranda Project: Interrogation of Draft Protesters, 77 YALE L.J. 300, 315 (1967).
This study was based on detailed interviews with 21 Yale faculty, staff members, and students
who turned in their draft cards as part of an antiwar protest and were then questioned by FBI
agents. When word spread that some students had been interrogated, a meeting was organized
(the Monday meeting) and members of the Yale Law Faculty "spoke on the legal rights of
persons being questioned ... explained some of the workings of the criminal process, and
discussed the possible objectives of the questioning;" the sense of the meeting was "that talking
to the FBI could serve no useful purpose and might conceivably be harmful." Id. at 303.
Nevertheless,
[Elven after the Monday meeting, in which the nature of the interrogator's job-
and in particular the fact that it is a job-was discussed, the suspects remained
largely unable to treat their encounter as an early stage in a formal, adversary legal
process. Instead, they tended to see the interview in personal terms, almost as if
they were talking to a new aquaintance....
The feeling of being socially obliged to answer somd questions was mentioned to
us by a sizable number of those questioned after Monday.... [Elven with that
background [the Monday meeting], many of them reported feeling rude when they
repeatedly told the agents that they refused to answer....
... [I]n the social situation we have described above, a question demands an
answer (Miranda states legal, not social, rules). The suspect is thus in a position of
having to decide whether to answer each question. In making each such decision, he
is subject to [various stresses and incapacities], and above all to the disability of
ignorance and the pressure of politeness.
Id. at 315-17 (emphasis in original).
A "social situation" had been established in the Des Moines police car by the time Captain
Learning delivered his speech. He and Williams had already engaged in considerable "small
talk"-had been "visiting," to use Leaming's term-and Leaming had already emphasized that
he had no personal feelings against his prisoner. See notes 45-46 supra and accompanying text.
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Williams, and the latter-undoubtedly nervous,48 possibly terrified,49
probably ashamed, hands cuffed behind his back,50 physically close to
Leaming 5 -would have shrunk from the prospect of flustering,
displeasing, or irritating his captor.52
Even when he had been in the more spacious and less coercive
confines of the Davenport courthouse and Lieutenant Ackerman had
asked him where the little girl was and whether she was safe-an
admission by the lieutenant that was never followed up at the trial nor
mentioned by any of the courts that passed on the case 53-Williams
48. Even those questioned under the much milder conditions described in note 47 supra
"were very nervous, on the whole.... The stakes were high and became more immediate by the
very fact of interrogation. More important, they were confronting authority directly; as one
suspect put it: 'Well, it was the FBI, you know.'" Griffiths & Ayres, supra note 47, at 314-15.
Well, it was a police captain, it was the chief of detectives of the Des Moines police force, you
know.
49. When Williams phoned his Des Moines lawyer from Davenport, he expressed fear that
somebody was "going to hit him in the head." Brief for Petitioner, Joint App. at 96. On the
drive back to Des Moines the first thing Williams asked Leaming was whether the captain "hated
him" and "wanted to kill him." Id. at 94-95, 79-80 (testimony of Captain Leaming). He also
voiced concern that the state officers following them in another car might want to kill him. See
note 46 supra.
50. Brief for Petitioner, Joint App. at 76, 83 (testimony of Captain Leaming).
51. Learning and Williams had been sitting close together in the back seat, no objects
intruding between them, and Williams knew they would be so positioned for the rest of the long
trip. See id. at 55, 71, 77, 83, 98.
[To be physically close is to be psychologically close. The situation has a structure
emphasizing to the persons involved the immediacy of their contact: in an
encounter [defined by social scientists, the author noted earlier, as a "type of social
arrangement that occurs when persons are in one another's immediate physical
presence"] there is opportunity for uninterrupted verbal communication, a strong
awareness of expressive nonverbal signs, the maintenance of poise and a sense of
roles, engrossment in the activity at hand, and an allocation of spatial position....
. . . When the norm governing spatial distance is violated, a person's
instantaneous and automatic response is to backup, again and again. The suspect,
unable to egcape, will become even more anxious and unsure.
Driver, Confessions and the Social Psychology of Coercion, 82 HARv. L. REV. 42, 44-46 (1968)
(footnotes omitted).
52. See note 47 supra.
53. At the pretrial hearing, Lieutenant Ackerman stated emphatically and repeatedly that he
made no effort to question Williams and that the latter said nothing to him at all. Brief for
Petitioner, Joint App. at 44-45. At the trial, however, when the lieutenant was cross-examined
by Williams' attorney, the following colloquy tooli place:
Q. Now didn't you yourself want to question this defendant?
A. Yes, sir, I did.
Q. What did he say to you?
A. I only asked him one question, where was the little girl and was she safe. I told
him that we were worried about the safety and the health of the little girl, and if she
was alive and if she was in the area, we would like to know so that we could get help
to her.
Q. Did he tell you that ypu ask my lawyer anything you want to know?
A. No, sir, he did not.
220
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had been careful not to offend, not to refuse firmly to discuss the
matter.14 It is hard to believe that he would have done so on the long
ride back to Des Moines. But Captain Leaming made it easy for
Williams-for the moment. He told him just to think about it. The
pressure would build, however, as they approached the Mitchellville
turnoff.
The first thing that strikes one about the earlier version of the
Christian burial speech is the very first word-"Reverend." Why did
Leaming call Williams that? How many times did he do so on the drive
back to Des Moines? These questions were never asked. No questions
about Williams being addressed as Reverend were ever asked.
When Leaming began his Christian burial speech, he and his
prisoner had been discussing religion in the back seat.55 Had Williams
just said something to the effect that he regarded himself as a man of
God or someone dedicated to God?56 Is that why Leaming chose this
moment to launch the Christian burial speech? Or did Learning call
his prisoner Reverend simply because it is a standard interrogation
technique, "when interrogating persons of low social status," to
Q. What did he say?.
A. He said, "Don't you know."
Q. Then what did he say?
A. I says, "Know what?" And, "My lawyer knows."
Q. He said his lawyer knows?
A. His lawyer knows, and that's all that was said.
Q. Now let's forget about this violation of the constitutional rights. Let me ask you
this [moving on to another topic].
rd. at 72-73.
It is hard to believe that when he headed home with Williams, Captain Leaming had not
conferred with Lieutenant Ackerman and learned about the latter's attempt to elicit information
from Williams and how Williams had responded. There is every indication that Learning was a
competent officer and it would seem that, as such, he would want to compare notes with the
lieutenant who had placed Williams under arrest, booked him, and put him in a cell. Id. at 42; see
F. ROYAL & S. SCHUTT, supra note 1, at 53 (before conducting interview or interrogation, officer
should talk to any other investigators who may have preceded him on case). After Learning
arrived in Davenport, his prisoner-to-be was granted two more private meetings with his
Davenport lawyer. Brief for Petitioner, Joint App. at 75-76. These two meetings took a total of
30-35 minutes, according to Leaming. Id During this time, Leaming probably conferred with
Lieutenant Ackerman. The record is silent on this point, as it is on too many others, but Leaming
did state that after Williams' first meeting with his lawyer, which lasted some 20 minutes, he,
Detective Nelson, and Lieutenant Ackerman reentered the room together. Id at 76.
54. See note 53 supra.
55. Brief for Petitioner, Joint App. at 81.
56. Cf F. INBAU & J. REID. CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONs 75 (2d ed. 1967)
(suggesting that the interrogator appeal to suspect's pride; for example, by complimenting a
clergyman accused of taking indecent liberties with a child for his dedication to God and
sacrifices as a man of God).
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address them by some title rather than by their first name?57 Or did he
do so simply because he was aware that "[t]he uneducated and
underprivileged are more vulnerable to flattery than the educated
person or the person in favorable financial or social circumstances"?"
The "Reverend" ploy would seem to reinforce another standard
interrogation technique that is well illustrated in both versions of
Leaming's speech-the appeal to Williams as a religious person, a
good Christian. Indeed, the leading manual on the subject discusses
both stratagems under the same subheading: "Appeal to the
Subject's Pride by Well-Selected Flattery or by a Challenge to His
Honor. ' 59 Under that subheading, the manual points out:
It is occasionally helpful to appeal to the subject's loyalty to
a group of persons or to an organization whose reputation
and honor has been jeopardized by the subject's unlawful
behavior. For instance, an appeal may be made in the name
of the subject's church, or any other organization or group
toward which the subject appears to have some loyalty or
allegiance.
61
The federal district court did not find that Captain Leaming called
Williams "Reverend," and Learning at the trial never said that he did.
The attorney general of Iowa, however, did not deny it. Even though
he contended that there was "little support in the record" for the
federal district court's finding "that Williams' statements were
obtained only after Detective Leaming's use of psychology on a
person whom he knew to be deeply religious and an escapee from a
57. Id. Interrogators are told that it is usually better to address persons of high social or
professional status "by their first name, or by their last name without attaching the 'Mr.,' 'Mrs.,'
or 'Miss,' "in order to dispel their "usual feeling of superiority and independence," but they are
advised to address those of low status as " 'Mr.,' 'Mrs.,' or 'Miss,' rather than by their first
name." Id Addressing an escapee from a mental hospital who is black and who had only been a
resident of the state for a few months as Reverend would seem to be applying this advice with a
vengeance. "The person of low social status is flattered and acquires a feeling of satisfaction and
dignity from such unaccustomed courtesy. By according this subject this consideration the
interrogator enhances the effectiveness of whatever he says or does thereafter." Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 73.
60. Id. at 76. Captain Learning may have buttressed his appeal to Williams in the name of
Christianity in still another way. In their very first conversation he told Williams that he himself
"had had religious training and background as a child" and woul *come nearer to praying for him
than to abusing him. See note 45 supra and accompanying text. This, in effect, informed
Williams that Learning knew and appreciated what Williams'moral or religious obligations were
under the circumstances.
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mental hospital, ' 61 he recognized that the "Reverend" stratagem
constituted some support for the court's finding. Conceding that
Leaming suspected that Williams was religious, the attorney general
continued: "While Leaming's notions are outside the record, he admits
he was in fact playing upon Williams' religious conscience when he
made the statements which are of record. And when he addressed
Williams as 'Reverend' he says he did so to win his friendship and
confidence.
'62
In his opinion for the Court, Justice Stewart describes the Christian
burial speech as follows: "Addressing Williams as 'Reverend,' the
Detective said .... ,,63 Justice Stewart then gives the second version
of the speech and related testimony in its entirety.64 But Leaming did
not address Williams as Reverend in the second version, only in the
first.
The attorney general of Iowa was sufficiently troubled by the
"Reverend" ploy to go outside the record to explain why Leaming
employed it. Justice Stewart also was sufficiently impressed by the
significance of the "Reverend" address to call attention to it. But why
did Leaming delete it from his trial testimony? Did similar factors
move Leaming to leave out other items as well? Or add others? Why is
the earlier version, which Leaming more or less volunteered to tell,
65
ignored except for the very first word? Why does the second version
become the official version?
The very first word of the first version of the Christian burial speech
may be jarring, but the most striking thing to me about the first
version, when read in its entirety, is that something has to be missing.
Captain Leaming tells his prisoner that he thinks "we're going to be
going right past where the body is," but does not tell him where he
thinks it is. An hour or two later, as the car approached the
61. Brief for Petitioner at 12 (quoting Williams v. Brewer, 375 F. Supp. 170, 183 (S.D. Iowa
1974)) (emphasis in original).
62. Id at 13 (emphasis in original).
63. 430 U.S. at 392.
64. Id. at 392-93.
65. When Captain Leaming was cross-examined at the pretrial hearing, the following colloquy
occurred:
Q. You didn't ask Williams any questions?
A. No, sir, I told him some things.
Q. You told him some things?
A. Yes, sir. Would you like to hear it?
A. Yes.
A. All right. I said to Mr. Williams, I said, "Reverend, rm going to tell you
something.
Brief for Petitioner, Joint App. at 62-63.
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Mitcheilville turnoff, Learning tells us that Williams asked him: "How
do [did?] you know that it would be at Mitchellville?" (emphasis
added). Sometime after he delivered the speech and sometime before
Williams asked him how he knew the body was in Mitchellville,
Learning must have told Williams that he knew it was buried there.
But when? Just before they approached the Mitchellville area?
Immediately after Leaming delivered the speech? Somewhere in
between? These questions were never asked at the pretrial hearing."
Moreover, the first version begins "I don't want you to answer me"
and ends "I just want you to think about that when we're driving down
the road." In the second version, the order is reversed. The second
time around Learning did fill the gap-he said that he told Williams he
"knew" the body "was somewhere in the Mitchellville area"
immediately after delivering the speech. Moreover, in the second
version Leaming said that he quickly added: "I don't want to discuss it
any further." The first time he testified, however, Leaming never said
that he told Williams he didn't want to discuss it any further.
The first version of the speech is considerably less solicitous of
Williams' rights than the second. According to the first version,
Learning prefaced his remarks with "I don't want you to answer me,"
then jolted, or tried to jolt or at least to agitate Williams with the news
that the police knew or thought they knew where the body was. If this
is how Leaming made the statement, whatever the captain told
Williams by way of introduction to the speech was probably
dissipated by the main thrust of the speech. After all, Leaming made a
strong pitch, and evidently a psychologically sound one. He appealed
to someone he knew to be deeply religious in the name of religion. He
did not ask Williams whether the little girl was alive or dead (as had
Lieutenant Ackerman earlier in the day).67 Nor did he ask Williams
whether he knew where the body was (as had Ackerman). 68 Rather,
Leaming's statement under either version assumed that the girl was
66. Although the gap in Leaming's testimony passed unnoticed by the defense, it did not
escape the prosecutor. His first question on redirect examination was: "Captain Learning, prior
to the defendant showing you where the body was, had you told him you thought it was in the
Mitcheilville area?" Leaming's answer was, "Yes, Sir"-that's all. Id. at 65. He did not tell the
prosecutor, and he was not asked, when he told this to Williams.
67. See note 53 supra and accompanying text.
68. Id.
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dead and assumed, too, that Williams knew where the body was.69
Moreover, Leaming's statement did more than merely imply that the
police knew, or had a pretty good idea, where the body was.
If Learning delivered the Christian burial speech the way he
testified he did at the pretrial hearing, then by the time Learning
finished the speech the prefatory remark "I don't want you to answer"
was surely no longer uppermost in Williams' mind, if it were still in his
mind at all. But then, still according to the first version, Learning left
Williams hanging: "I just want you to think about that when we're
driving down the road."
What does that mean? I just want you to think about that when
we're driving down the road toward the place where the girl is buried? I
just want you to think about that while we're driving down the road
and I want you to decide whether or not you want to show us the body by
the time we reach the turnoff to the area where the body is? That is what
Leaming wanted, isn't it? It would not be unreasonable for his
addressee to so interpret his closing remark, would it?
Why, according to the first version, did the captain preface his
speech with "I don't want you to answer me"? Perhaps he did so
because Williams already had asserted his rights many times that
day.70 Indeed, the most plausible interpretation of the record is that
Williams had already asserted his rights on the drive back to Des
Moines; he had informed Leaming, at least for the first time, that he
69. See text accompanying notes 41-42 supra. This is another suggested interrogation
technique:
[Wihen the interrogator has reason to believe that the subject possesses or knows
the whereabouts of an instrument or article which might have some connection
with the crime, instead of merely asking, "Do you have such-and-such?" or "Do
you know where such-and-such is?", it is much better to assume in the question that
the subject does have, or does know the location of, the object being sought....
[After discussing a case where the interrogator successfully elicited a confession
by assuming in his question that an alleged sex deviate kept a diary, the manual
continues:] There is every reason to believe that in the foregoing case, if the issue
of the diary had been brought up in any way other than by the question, "Where is
your diary?" the subject probably would not have divulged its existence or its
whereabouts .... Had the interrogator merely asked, "Do you have a diary?" the
subject probably would have inferred that its existence was not already known and
therefore denied that he had one. With the question phrased in such a way as to
imply a certainty of its existence, however, it .became difficult for the subject to
make a denial-because for all he knew the interrogator or other investigators might
already be aware of its existence or actually have it in their possession.
F. INBAU & J. REID, supra note 56, at 83-84 (emphasis added).
True, the manual talks about "questions" by the interrogator that assume the existence of
certain information, not "statements" by the interrogator, but the "psychology" is essentially
the same.
70. See notes 13-17 supra and accompanying text.
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would tell him "the whole story" when he got back to Des Moines and
met with his lawyer.' Finally, Leaming probably knew that his
Davenport counterpart previously had asked Williams where the little
girl was and had come up emptyhanded 2 Under the circumstances,
was Leaming's prefatory remark about not wanting Williams to
answer him a way of pretending to concede to him his rights? This, we
are told by the experts, "usually has a very undermining effect" on
someone who asserts, or has asserted, his rights.
73
Did Leaming's prefatory remark enhance, or was it designed to
enhance, the effectiveness of the main body of Leaming's speech by
impressing Williams at the outset with his captor's apparent
fairness? 74 Was this more evidence of Leaming's sympathy and
integrity? A further effort to project an image that matched Williams'
concept of the "respected figure"?"
5
71. Although the record is not as clear as it ought to be on this point, according to Learning
the first time Williams made this statement was "not too long after we got on the freeway, after
we had gassed up [in Davenport] and started-got on the highway and started toward Des
Moines. He told me that the first time." Brief for Petitioner, Joint App. at 65-66. This almost
certainly must have occurred before the Christian burial speech, which was preceded by a
considerable amount of conversation. See Brief for the Respondent, at 17 n.9 (elaborate analysis
of the record reaching same conclusion).
72. See note 53 supra and accompanying text. Unfortunately, this point was never explored at
the trial.
73. F. INBAU & J. REID. CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 111 (1st ed. 1962).
Specifically, the authors state:
The most effective way to deal with a subject who refuses to discuss the matter
under investigation is to concede him the right to remain silent. This usually has a
very undermining effect. First of all, he is disappointed in his expectation of an
unfavorable reaction on the part of the interrogator. Secondly, a concession of this
right to remain silent impresses the subject with the apparent fairness of his
interrogator.
Id. True, Williams had not refused to talk about the case at all. He had asked some questions
about fingerprints and police procedures. But he had not yet supplied the police with any
information. He had not yet said anything about the little girl's whereabouts, and had refused to
do so when Lieutenant Ackerman asked him about that. In this setting, pretending to concede to
Williams his rights would seem to amount to essentially the same "psychological conditioning"
as discussed above.
74. See note 73 supra.
75. Cf F. ROYAL& S. ScHUrr. supra note 1, at 122, 134 (suggesting methods of interrogation).
Specifically, the authors state:
When a person desires to confide his troubles voluntarily, he does not go to an
enemy or confederate, but rather to a parent, clergyman, medical doctor, lawyer,
close friend, or some other respected person who he feels will understand, console,
and advise him. When a criminal violator confesses, he, in reality, surrenders his
very being and his own free will and destiny into the hands of the interrogator, etc.
He will find it much easier to submit if he believes in the interrogator's integrity
and is sympathetic to his position. He must believe that the interrogator is neither
prosecutor, judge, nor jury.
... IW]en the interviewer projects an image that matches the subject's concept
of the "respected figure," the subject's defenses are reduced and deterrents to
226
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Up to this point, I have dwelt primarily on what Captain Leaming
might have said. But the more significant question, I submit, is what
Williams might reasonably have understood the captain to say. Why
did Williams disclose the location of the body? Was he motivated by
the Christian burial speech? Or did he spontaneously offer to find the
body?
That Williams probably told the captain at least once after the
Christian burial speech that he would reveal "the whole story" when
he returned, to Des Moines and met with his lawyer 76 was deemed
significant by both the Supreme Court majority and by dissenting
Justice White. 7 I think it more significant, however, that Williams
probably told Learning the same thing at least once before, and
apparently just before, the speech was delivered. 8 If so, then
Williams might well have viewed Leaming's Christian burial speech as
a response to his offer to cooperate by revealing the whole story after
they returned to Des Moines. And Leaming's speech would have
sounded like an expression of dissatisfaction with Williams' limited
offer to cooperate. If I am right, then what Williams probably heard
when Leaming delivered the speech, and what any reasonable person
sitting in the back seat of the Des Moines car could well have heard
was something like this:
Your offer to tell us or show us where the body is after we
get back to Des Moines (or have your lawyer or you and your
lawyer do so) isn't good enough. For one thing, the way the
snow is coming down you might not be able to show us
where the body is if we wait that long. I want you to think
deception are established. The subject's concept of the "respected figure" image
is obtainable by studying his subjective needs and conscious desires. The subject's
concept, once assessed, is then assumed or projected back at him through the
interviewer's acting-out process.
Id.
Recall that the captain had already told Williams that he himself "had had religious training
and background as a child" and would probably come nearer to "praying for" Williams than
injuring him. See note 45 supra and accompanying text. That doesn't sound like the prosecutor,
judge, or jury talking.
76. See Brief for Petitioner, Joint App. at 58, 60 (Williams told Learning several times during
trip that he would tell the whole story in Des Moines); id. at 65-66 (first time Williams said he
would tell the whole story later was not too long after car got on freeway leaving Davenport).
77. Compare Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 405 (1977) (Williams' statements that he
would tell the whole story after seeing McKnight were clear expressions that he desired the
presence of an attorney before being interrogated) with id at 432 (White, J., with Blackmun &
Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting) (Williams' statement that he would tell the whole story after seeing
McKnight indicated his knowledge of his rightto have counsel present before being interrogated).
78. See note 71 supra and accompanying text.
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about telling us or showing us where the body is before we
get back.
Of course, the captain not only told his prisoner what he wanted him
to do, but why-to enable the parents to give their little girl a good
Christian burial. What did that mean? What was the point of that?
What any reasonable listener would hear, even if he weren't religious,
even if it weren't the day after Christmas," was: "The only decent and
honorable thing for you to do is to show us where that body is on the
way back to Des Moines. "80
The impact on Williams of the Christian burial speech and the
surrounding circumstances was probably so profound that at the very
least it cast a shadow over anything Learning might have said about
not answering him or not wanting to discuss the matter. If Williams
had known any Emerson, been calm enough to recall it, and bold
enough to recite it, he might have responded: "What you are stands
over you the while, and thunders so that I cannot hear what you say to
the contrary. 
'81
We need not limit ourselves to speculation about what the
hypothetical listener would have heard or apprehended Captain
Leaming as saying when he gave his now famous speech. We can do a
little better than that. There was another listener in the Des Moines
police car-Detective Nelson. Although this point was not pursued at
trial nor picked up in any of the courts that passed on the case, the
following colloquy occurred when Nelson was cross-examined:
Q. [Y]ou weren't interrogating?
A. No.
79. Justice Powell, concurring in Williams, recognized the importance of the totality of
circumstances surrounding the speech:
[TIhe entire setting was conducive to the psychological coercion that was
successfully exploited. Williams was known by the police to be a young man with
quixotic religious convictions and a history of mental disorders. The date was the
day after Christmas, the weather was ominous, and the setting appropriate for
Detective Leaming's talk of snow concealing the body and preventing a "Christian
burial."
430 U.S. at 412.
80. Although he did not say it in so many words, what Learning did, in effect, was to use
another recommended interrogation technique: "The expression, 'It's the only decent and
honorable thing to do,' appears to constitute somewhat of a challenge for the offender to display
some evidence of decency and honor." F. INBAU & J. REm, supra note 56, at 61. It was a
challenge, Learning must have figured, that Williams would find hard to resist.
81. R.W. EMERSON, LETTERS AND SOCIAL AIMs 86 (1876).
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Q. So everything you testified to, Williams just started
talking?
A. He did a lot of talking, yes, sir.
Q. Without anybody asking him anything?
A. Yes, other than ... when we left Davenport, Captain
Leaming asked him to think about telling us where the
body is.
8 2
Williams himself, when he testified, complained repeatedly that
Learning told him that he might as well reveal where the body was on
the trip back to Des Moines because after Williams got back, he and
his lawyer would show the police where the body was anyway;83 that it
"would be a waste of time to go all the way to Des Moines to get
[McKnight] and come back, and that's what [they] would have to do,
[and if they did they would] probably be on the road all hours of the
night";84 and that McKnight "had already instructed [the police that]
as soon as ... [Williams] got to Des Moines [they] would come back
and show [the police] where the body was." ' Williams' version of what
was said is significantly stronger than either version given by
Leaming. There is nothing in the record to indicate whether Williams'
testimony is merely his understanding of what Leaming admitted to
having said or whether Leaming really said more. Although Leaming
testified twice, nobody asked him whether he told Williams any of
these things.8 6 Yet Williams insisted that these were the things that
influenced him to show the police where the body was. 7 Putting aside
all of Williams' testimony, we are still left with this: Learning and Chief
Nichols both swore under oath that McKnight told Williams over the
phone in their presence that Williams or McKnight would reveal the
location of the body after Williams returned to Des Moines. 88 Thus,
82. Brief for Petitioner, Joint App. at 104 (emphasis added).
83. Id at 53.
84. Id. at 48.
85. Id. at 71.
86. At one point the prosecuting attorney asked Learning, "Did you at any time tell Mr.
Williams that Mr. McKnight told you to tell Williams that he was to tell you the whole story on
the way back from Davenport?" Learning denied it. Id. at 58. That was all.
87. Id. at 71.
88. The long-distance phone conversation between Williams and McKnight is one of the most
mystifying features of the record. See note 23 supra. Shortly after Williams surrendered to the
Davenport police, they allowed him to phone McKnight, who took the call in Captain Leaming's
office. William s' lawyer then permitted both Learning and the Des Moines police chief Nichols to
hear his end of the conversation. Brieffor Petitioner, Joint App. at37-38, 40-43,54,64,88-90, 96.
McKnight did not testify himself as to what he said, but both Captain Learning and Chief
Nichols did. Learning said that he heard McKnight say to Williams: "'You have to tell the
officers where the body is,' and he repeated a second time, 'You have got to tell them where she
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when Leaming told Williams in the course of rendering his Christian
burial speech that he felt they should locate the body on the way to Des
Moines rather than on the following morning, he made a powerful
argument. Williams had no reason to doubt the captain's implicit
assumption that these were his only two options. It reasonably
appeared to him that this was indeed the case.
Even if Learning told Williams no more than the second version
indicates, in light of the earlier phone conversation with McKnight
what Williams might well have heard Leaming say, and what any
reasonable person in Williams' plight might well have heard, is what
Williams testified he did hear-because his only alternative would be
to go all the way to Des Moines, get his lawyer, and come back to the
same spot later and under more adverse weather conditions, it would
be a waste of time not to show the police where the body was now. 89
I do not deny that Williams also told the captain one or more times
after he had heard the famous speech that he would tell him the whole
story when he got back to Des Moines and saw his lawyer. But why?
Did Williams just say it out of the blue, which seems unlikely, or did
somebody or something prompt him to say it?
is.'... He then said, 'When you get back here, you tell me and I'll tell them. I am going to tell
them the whole story.'" Id. at 96.
Chief Nichols more or less supported Learning. He testified that McKnight told Williams,
"We will talk when you get here." Id. at 40. When asked by the prosecutor whether McKnight
told Williams that he was going to have to tell the police "everything" or "where she is" or
"something of that nature," he replied: "Something of that nature." Id. at 41.
Finally, Williams' lawyer in Davenport, Kelly, testified that he told Captain Learning upon his
arrival that it was his "understanding" that when Williams was returned to Des Moines, "You
[McKnight] would talk to Williams in Leaming's office and at that time he [Williamsi would
reveal where the body was." Id. at 107.
What McKnight had in mind when he spoke to Williams is unclear. Conceivably, he was trying
to pacify the police officials he knew were listening to his end of the conversation. Perhaps
McKnight thought that by instructing Williams, in earshot of the police officers, that he would
have to turn up the body after he returned to Des Moines, he would be removing any incentive on
the officers' part to question Williams on the way back. But Williams, of course, would not have
known that was his lawyer's motivation.
Quite possibly, as concurring Justice Marshall assumed, McKnight's plan was to learn the
whereabouts of the body from his client and then to lead the police to the body himself. 430 U.S.
at 408. In this way, as Justice Marshall observed, Williams "would thereby be protected by the
attorney-client privilege from incriminating himself by directly demonstrating his knowledge of
the body's location, and the unfortunate Powers child could be given a 'Christian burial.' "Id. If
this were McKnight's plan, however, there is no indication in the record that he explained it,
clearly or otherwise, to his client.
In any event, the crucial question is not what McKnight meant, or even what he said, but what
his client understood him as saying. If the chief of police and the chief of detectives
misunderstood McKnight, and if Williams' lawyer in Davenport misunderstood the
arrangements, then surely it is reasonable and probable that Williams misunderstood, too.
89. None of the courts that passed on the case discussed this point.
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There is nothing in the record about why Williams made these
statements or how Leaming responded when he did. Ignoring, as
everyone does, Williams' testimony that the captain "questioned me
periodically concerning where the body was ... [not] in rapid
succession... [but] as we travelled a few miles~at a time," 90 the most
plausible alternative explanation is that the speech had such a
powerful impact on Williams that long after it had been delivered he
could still "hear" it. And it may well have sounded louder and louder
as the Mitchellville turnoff loomed nearer.
If so, then Williams' postspeech statement(s) that he would tell the
whole story after they completed the trip may not have been, as
Justice White suggested in his dissent, "an indication that he knew he
was entitled to wait until counsel was present before talking to the
police." 91 Nor was it necessarily, as the majority suggests, "the'
clearest expression ... that he desired the presence of an attorney
before an interrogation took place." 92 Williams' insistence that he
would tell the whole story later more likely was a manifestation of the
continuing, and perhaps mounting, pressure he felt as the car
approached Mitchellville. If so, Williams' postspeech statements were
not simply an acknowledgement that he was aware of his rights or an
assertion of his right to counsel, but rather a reiteration-in the face of
the captain's counterproposal-of his original position. Which
inference you draw, however, is dependent upon which version of the
facts you believe. Williams' version? Leaming's first version?
Leaming's second version?
The foregoing reading of the record is consistent with Captain
Leaming's original description of how Williams finally announced that
he was going to show the police where the body was, but finds
considerably less support in the version Leaming gave at trial.
According to the latter, Williams with no warning and without any
preliminary discussion or questions about the body simply blurted out
that he was going to show Leaming where the body was.93 If so, one
can hardly blame the captain for not covering his ears-or Williams'
mouth. Moreover, according to the second version it is only after
Williams made this long-awaited announcement and while he was
already in the process of guiding the police to the dead girl's clothing
90. Brief for Petitioner, Joint App. at 47-48.
91. 430 U.S. at 432 (White, J., with Blackmun & Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting).
92. Id. at 405.
93. Brief for Petitioner, Joint App. at 84. This was, however, after Williams had led Learning
to where he had hidden the girl's boots and the blanket he used to carry her, although neither
was found. Id. at 83-84.
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that he asked Leaming how he knew the body was in the Mitchellville
area.
94
In the original version, however, the order is reversed. According to
this version, Williams led up to the disclosure of the body by asking
the captain how he knew it would be in the Mitchellville area.95 If so,
this indicates that Williams had been thinking about the speech quite
a bit, perhaps all the time they were travelling down the road, and that
when Mitchellville was only minutes away he began wobbling.
According to the original version, just before making the crucial
disclosure Williams alerted the captain that he was about to do so. Of
course, in light of the many times he had asserted his rights that day,
both before and after the group had started on the return trip back to
Des Moines, Williams was also alerting the captain that he might be
assuming "contradictory positions" 96-that his apparent change of
mind might not be a waiver of his rights, but rather the product of the
anxiety and confusion generated by the speech and the imminence of
the Mitchellville turnoff-or that he might be laboring under the
misapprehension that once he got back to Des Moines he would have
to show the police where the body was anyway.9
The captain, however, did nothing to clear up any possible
misunderstanding. Nor at this high pressure point in the return trip
did he advise Williams, as he had done just before they left
Davenport, that he wanted him to remember what he told him about
his rights. Nor did he say, as he claimed to have when he gave the
speech, that he didn't want Williams to answer him or to discuss the
matter (if he ever told him that). Quite the contrary. Leaming did
discuss the matter. He sensed that his patience was about to pay off
and he moved in for the kill. At this point, he was more firm and more
94. Id. at 84.
95. Id. at 63.
96. See United States v. Springer, 460 F.2d 1344, 1349-50 (7th Cir. 1972) (police not
required to make further inquiry into waiver because no contradictory positions maintained
when suspect surrendered to authorities to exculpate himself, waived his rights, and
subsequently implicated himself); United States v. Hopkins, 433 F.2d 1041, 1044 (5th Cir.
1970) (suspect did not manifest inconsistent conduct because of confusion when he refused to
sign waiver form but then volunteered further statements when agent ceased questioning and
began to leave); Frazier v. United States (Frazier I), 419 F.2d 1161, 1168-69 (D.C. Cir. 1969)
(no valid waiver of fifth amendment rights when suspect signed waiver form but then evidenced
confusion by asking agent not to record confession); United States v. Nielson, 392 F.2d 849, 853
(7th Cir. 1968) (police should have inquired further to determine if waiver valid when suspect
assumed contradictory positions by refusing to sign waiver form but then immediately offering to
continue responding to questions). See generally, Y. KAMIsAn. W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL. MODERN
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 574-77 (4th ed. 1974).
97. See notes 83-89 supra and accompanying text.
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emphatic about his knowledge of the body's location: "I'm an
investigator. This is my job, and I just figured it out.
9 8
All this, of course, is based on the events that led up to Williams'
disclosure as they appear in Leaming's original testimony. These
events find no counterpart in what the state of Iowa called the
"essentially" similar second version. 99
SOME FINAL THOUGHTS
Williams raises some nice questions about the meaning, scope of,
and interplay between the Massiah and Miranda principles. But that
is the subject of another article. This one is designed to raise some
painful questions about the practical application of those principles-
or for that matter about the administration of any rules governing the
admissibility of confessions. As I trust those who have come this far
with me will agree, the various opinions in Williams totter on an
incomplete, contradictory, and recalcitrant record. The Supreme
Court-and all our courts-deserve better and should demand more.
This case does involve some unusual features. Its peculiarities,
however, do not detract from but only illuminate the problem posed
by the typical confession case-secret proceedings absent any
objective recordation of the facts.100 If either one of Captain
Leaming's two versions of the critical events on the drive back to Des
Moines had been his only version, it would have been treated, as an
officer's testimony usually is, as the gospel truth. But the case
happens to involve an "interrogator" (or should we call him an
"elicitor") who testified twice and significantly differently each time.
So questions are raised.
If Leaming's only antagonist had been Williams, no doubts about
the captain's credibility would have surfaced. But this case happens
98. Brief for Petitioner, Joint App. at 63. If this does not amount to "play[ing] the role of the
expert," said to be a "common method of building amplification of guilt as it relates to
insecurity," it at least constitutes "speak[ing] with an aura of positive knowledge," a method said
to renew "the insecurity process the subject formerly experienced." F. ROYAL& S. SCHuWWrsupra
note 1, at 137.
99. Brief for Petitioner at 9 n.1.
100. See Kamisar, Equal Justice in the Gatehouses and Mansions of American Criminal
Procedure: From Powell to Gideon, From Escobedo To.. ., in Y. KAMISAR, F. INBAU & T. ARNOLD,
CRIINAL JUSTICE IN OUR TIME 84-88 (A. Howard ed. 1965) (no statute, court rule, or court
decision will suffice until police interrogation is stripped of its secrecy); Weisberg, Police
Interrogation of Arrested Persons: A Skeptical View, 52 J. CRMI. L.C. & P.S. 21, 44-45 (1961),
reprinted in POLICE POWER AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 153, 179-80 (C. Sowle ed. 1962) (most
unique feature of police station questioning is its characteristic secrecy).
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to involve an officer who got into swearing contests with the defense
lawyers themselves, as well as with a criminal suspect. Because the
captain lost every time he tangled with one of the lawyers,10 1 some
doubts are raised, or ought to be raised, about the swearing contest
that he won when he disputed Williams.
Although the special features of the Williams case constitute
alerting circumstances, any trial of the issue of waiver, 10 2 no less than
that of coercion' 013-waged by the crude, clumsy method of
101. See notes 21-28 supra and accompanying text.
102. See MODEL CODE, supra note 28, §130.4, Commentary at 341-42.
Much of the opposition to stationhouse interrogation and to making the right to
counsel during questioning waivable reflects concern about the danger of police
abuse which cannot subsequently be established in court, a concern which has in
no way been lessened by the Miranda decision. . . . Although [specified
procedures] should help prevent misconduct based on uncertainty about the rules,
the risk of abuse from a deliberate or careless violation remains. Therefore, the
Code requires the making of written records and sound recordings to help a court
to reconstruct what took place while an individual is under police control.
Id; see id. § 130.4 note, at 39.
Subsection (3) [requiring the establishment of procedures providing for a sound
recording of the Miranda warnings and any subsequent waiver] is designed to help
eliminate factual disputes concerning what was said to the arrested person and
what prompted any incriminating statements....
In view of the indications in Miranda that the prosecution has a heavy burden of
proof to show the validity of any waiver it would seem clear that the obligation to
tape should include any such waivers.
Id The recent case of Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975), no less than Williams,
underscores the need for sound recordings to help the courts determine whether a valid waiver
actually occurred. In Mosley the Court held that police may renew the questioning of a suspect
who has exercised his right to remain silent at an earlier interrogation session, provided the
suspect's right to cut off the questioning is "fully respected" or "scrupulously honored." Id. at
103-05. The Court apparently deemed it critical, certainly highly significant, that after declining
to discuss certain robberies at an initial interrogation Mosley was subsequently questioned about
"an unrelated holdup murder." I at 104. But it is not at all clear that this was so. Professor
Geoffrey Stone has pointed out that the Michigan courts never found-indeed the Michigan
Court of Appeals expressed skepticism about the contention-that the subject of the robbery-
murder was never brought up at the initial interrogation session. Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in
the Burger Court 1977 Sup. CT. REv. 99, 130. Professor Stone, who has studied the Mosley
record (I have not), notes that "Detective Cowie initially testified that he discussed 'several
robberies' with Mosley, [but] then changed his testimony, and insisted that he questioned Mosley
only about the White Tower Restaurant robbery. According to Cowie, however, Mosley declined
to say anything 'about the robberies.'" Id at 134 (emphasis added). It seems almost incredi-
ble that in the 1970's a murner suspect such as Mosley could twice be questioned-the
second time after the exercise of his right of silence-in the departmental headquarters building
(not in a car or on the street) without any police effort to make an objective record of either
interrogation session, and that no court passing on the case would so much as raise questions
about the need or obligation of the police to make such a record.
103. See Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 443-44, 444 n.2 (1958) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(the issue of coercion is difficult to resolve at trial when the defendant has been interrogated out
of the presence of counsel and conflicting accounts are given of what took place); In re Groban,
352 U.S. 330, 340 (1957) (Black, J., dissenting) (one who has been privately interrogated has
little hope of challenging the testimony of his interrogator as to what was said and done).
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examination, cross-examination, and redirect-is almost bound to be
unsatisfactory. The Williams record illustrates this all too painfully.
The record tells us that several times during the long drive back to
Des Moines, Williams told Captain Leaming that he would tell him
"the whole story" after he returned to Des Moines and conferred with
his lawyer.10 4 That's about all. Although all sorts of inferences may be
drawn from the record, and admittedly I have drawn a few, we do not
really know how often Williams said it or when he said it. Nor do we
really know why he said it or how the captain responded, if at all, any
of'the times he said it.
The first time Captain Leaming testified, all he sdid on direct
examination about the Christian burial speech was that shortly after
they got on the expressway, he and Williams had "had quite a
discussion relative to religion. °10 5 That's all. Only on cross-
examination did Learning reveal for the first time-and he more or
less volunteered it 06-that he had made a Christian burial statement.
Williams, who had preceded the captain to the witness stand, had
never alluded to anything resembling the Christian burial state-
ment.10 7 If it had not happened to pop out on Leaming's cross-
examination-and it came out more or less accidentally-there never
would have been a "Christian burial speech case."
Which of the two versions is the real speech? Is it some combination
of the two? Or is it a third and never-to-be-known version? Is it
possible that there was more than one Christian burial speech? Re-
call that Learning initially described the Christian burial speech simply
as "quite a discussion relative to religion." At the other end of the trip,
just before Williams announced that he was going to tell the police
where the body was, there were, Leaming testified on direct
examination, "further discussions about people and religion."' 1 8 What
kinds of discussions? About Christian burials? About confession being
good for the soul? We will never know. Nobody ever asked.
104. Brief for Petitioner, Joint App. at 58; 61, 65-66.
105. Id at 56.
106. Q. You didn't ask Williams any questions?
A. No, sir, I told him some things.
Q. You told him some things?
A. Yes, sir. Would you like to hear it?
Id at 62.
107. Williams did recall a statement by Leaming that he had "an idea" or "knowledge" that
the body was buried in the Mitchellville area, and this was one of the points made in connection
with the Christian burial statement. See notes 112-14 infra and accompanying text. But Williams
never mentioned that the captain had told him that the parents deserved, ought to have, or were
entitled to a Christian burial for their little girl, or anything to that effect.
108. Williams v. Brewer, 375 F. Supp. 170, 175 (S.D. Iowa 1974); Brief for Petitioner, Joint
App. at 84.
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The federal district court found,10 9 and members of the Supreme
Court operated on the premise,110 that the captain had told Williams
that he "knew" the little girl's body was in the Mitchellville area
(which was untrue). But the first time Williams testified on the subject
he recalled variously that the captain had told him that the police had
"some speculation that the body was near Mitchellville"'' (which was
true); that "we have an idea it's near Mitchellville"112 (which was also
true); and that the police had "knowledge or good reason to believe"
that the body was in Mitchellville"' (the second half of which was very
close to the truth). Moreover, the first time Leaming broached the
subject, he said in response to a question by McKnight that "yes, sir,"
he did tell Williams: "I theorize that the body is at Mitchellville"
11
4
(which was the precise truth). And the second time he brought up the
subject, the captain said he told Williams: "I think that we're going to
be going right past where that body is.""1 5 Finally, Detective Nelson,
who drove the car back to Des Moines, maintained that Captain
Learning did not tell Williams that "he knew" the body was in the
Mitchellville area, but "that hepresumed the body was in the area."
116
How much longer can we go on like this?
I do not share the view of the Williams dissenters that analytically
Williams "is a far cry from Massiah,' 7 but in one sense it is. In
Massiah the critical conversation between petitioner and "secret"
agent Colson, who was Massiah's "friend" and partner in crime, also
took place in a car. But the conversation not only was transmitted to a
nearby agent by means of a radio transmitter hidden under the front
seat of the car, it also was tape-recorded over a minifon device
109. Williams v. Brewer, 375 F. Supp. 170, 175 (S.D. Iowa 1974).
110. See 430 U.S. at 393 (Learning told Williams that he knew the body was in the
Mitchellville area); id. at 432 (White, J., with Blackmun & Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting) (same).
111. Brief for Petitioner, Joint App. at 47-48 (emphasis added).
112. Id. at 53 (emphasis added).
113. Id at 52 (emphasis added).
114. Id at 61 (emphasis added).
115. Id. at 63 (emphasis added). Of course, Learning also testified that he told Williams that
he had "figured it out" and "knew" that the body was somewhere in the Mitchellville area. Id. at
63, 84.
116. Id. at 104 (emphasis added).
117, See 430 U.S. at 426 n.8 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (in contrast to admissions made by
Williams, Massiah's statements were obtained surreptitiously, without prior warnings, and could
not be independently verified as reliable); id. at 430 n.1 (White, J., with Blackmun & Rehnquist,
JJ., dissenting) (although issue in Williams is defendant's waiver of rights, question of waiver
never addressed in Massiah, as defendant in that case was unaware both of right to counsel and
of informant's identity); id. at 440 & n.3 (Blackmun, J., with White & Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting)
(statements made by Williams, unlike those of Massiah, were the product neither of a ruse nor of
an "interrogation"). My reasons for disagreeing with the dissenters will be discussed at length in
a future article to be published in the Georgetown Law Journal.
236 [Vol. 66:201
HeinOnline  -- 66 Geo. L. J. 236 1977-1978
CIRcuITs NOTE: CRIMINAL
concealed in the glove compartment.11 8 In arguing for the admissi-
bility of the recording,119 then Solicitor General Archibald Cox
observed:
No less important than its utility in helping law enforcement
is the fact that [the recording of such conversations]
safeguards defendants from distorted testimony and aids
the administration of justice.... Even slight nuances in
describing a conversation may be of crucial importance....
Surely, it is preferable that these crucial facts be
established by a recording of the conversation itself....
The recording of the conversation in this case (which we
have filed with the Clerk) would have gi-en assurance that
the agent had correctly testified that petitioner had actually
admitted his guilt to Colson, and that he was neither
coerced nor improperly induced to make the admissions.
120
Whatever the objections to a government informer or undercover
agent secretly recording a conversation between himself and a suspect
or instantaneously transmitting such a conversation to other agents
equipped with radio receivers,121 they are of little force when applied
to a situation in which police, known to be such, have isolated a person
from the protection of his lawyer for the purpose of "persuading" or
"inducing" him to furnish incriminating evidence.
122
118. Brief for United States at 8, Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
119. In the district court Massiah successfully objected to admitting these tapes on the
grounds that they contained statements relating to other defendants and to privileged matters.
Id The Government, however, filed the recording with the Clerk and maintained that the
recording confirmed the testimony of its agent that Colson "did not coerce petitioner into
making any incriminating statements or even induce him by appeals to talk in the guise of
friendship." Id at 21, 27.
120. Id at 20-21.
121. See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 787-89 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(warrantless third-party bugging undermines the confidence and sense of security of individual
relationships and might smother the spontaneity that liberates daily life); Lopez v. United
States, 373 U.S. 427, 465-66, 470-71 (1963) (Brennan, J., with Douglas & Goldberg, JJ.,
dissenting) (electronic surveillance gives rise to police omniscience, one of the most effective
tools of tyranny, strikes at freedom of communication, and destroys privacy).
122. "Courts which have considered the question have held that secret recording of police
interrogation does not, in itself, affect the admissibility of statements." MODEL CODE, supra note
28, § 130.4(2), Commentary at 349.
The Model Code does provides that an arrestee be informed that a sound recording is being
made, but recognizes that this requirement "raises a difficult question." Id at 348. Such a
requirement does minimize the possibility that an arrestee will be misled about the seriousness
of his situation, but knowledge that they are being recorded may make many reluctant to speak,
even those who would not be inhibited by the knowledge that what they were saying was being
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The short answer to the objection that it is not always feasible to
utilize tape recordings is that it should only be required when it is.
Certainly, the Des Moines police, or the Davenport police, or the
State Bureau of Criminal Investigation agents, some of whom
followed Leaming and Williams all the way back, could have come up
with a re.cording device. An objective, reliable record of the
proceedings in the car not only seems to have been feasible, but also
highly advisable. 123 After all, Williams was one of the biggest murder
cases in the state's history. In all likelihood the use of a recording
device, a tiny administrative and financial burden, would have spared
the state the need to contest the admissibility of Williams' disclosures
in five courts for eight years.
It is hard to see why the judges, upon whom these "Finnegans Wake
records" are inflicted, are so apathetic about the apparent unwilling-
ness of police interrogators to use tape recordings. 124 A veteran
reduced to writing (although it could lead some to talk more freely, secure in the knowledge that
they would not be misquoted). See id. at 348-49.
Informing the arrestee that what he may say will be recorded is probably preferable, but I do
not feel strongly about it. The important thing is that wherever feasible all conversation between
the police and a person in custody be tape recorded, whether or not the person is informed that
this is taking place. If the price for a system requiring sound recordings of the warnings, any
waivers or other responses, and any subsequent conversation is that the suspect need not be told
that a sound recording is being made, I would be quite willing to pay it.
123. The same may be said for Lieutenant Ackerman's dealings with Williams in the
Davenport courthouse. The lieutenant, it will be recalled, first denied, then admitted, that he
had questioned Williams about the girl's whereabouts.
124. The problem may not be the unwillingness of the police to use tape recordings as much
as the reluctance to offer the tapes in evidence. In an unknown but considerable number of cases
the police may tape record an interrogation for their own purposes, but with no intent to offer it
in evidence (as opposed to the resulting confession itself) and with no expectation that it will
ever get beyond the confines of the stationhouse. C.E. O'HARA. FUNDAMEN1'ALS OF CRIMINAL
INVESTIGArION 154 (4th ed. 1976) recommends that "the room set apart for interrogations or for
interviews in the offices of the law enforcement agency should be equipped with a permanent
recording installation," pointing out that there may be several purposes in recording an
interrogation other than offering it in evidence: if a suspect contradicts himself or falls into
inconsistencies, by playing the interrogation back to him "he may be brought to appreciate the
futility of deception," id. at 155; if a suspect implicates associates or accomplices, "the record
can later be played for the associates for the purposes of inducing them to confess," id. at 156; if
the interrogator is unable to spot weaknesses in the suspect's story or if the interrogation is
interrupted, the officer can listen to the tape, "analyze it for consistency and credibility," and,
"after determining the weak points, he can then plan the strategy and tactics to be employed in
the next interrogation session." Id.
In State v. Biron, 266 Minn. 272, 123 N.W.2d 392 (1963), one of the very few reported cases
where a tape recording of the entire interrogation-right from the first question asked-became
part of the record, the police decision to make a recording was based on the expectation that Biron
would confess or make damaging admissions in a relatively short time and that the playing of his
taped remarks to his accomplices would cause them to do likewise. But Biron "held out" a good
deal longer than expected, and one or more of the five detectives who took turns questioning him
were unaware that they were being taped. The tape did wind up in evidence-and itwas disastrous
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criminal investigator and leading authority on investigative methods
and technology tells us:
One of the characteristics of modern criminal investigation
is the extensive use of recording devices for the production
of a transcript of interviews and interrogations. Obviously,
the best evidence of an interview is the recorded voice. The
words themselves are there; the tones and inflection provide
the true meaning;...
... Sensitive interviews and interrogations should always
be recorded in important cases.... If the interview must
take place in a room, automobile, or restaurant without
previous technical preparation, a pocket recorder can be
used or one which is concealed in a briefcase. The
investigator can be wired for the occasion, i.e., a microphone
and small recorder can be attached to his person and
concealed beneath his clothes.
125
It was good of Captain Leaming to tell Williams, as they were about
to leave Davenport, to be sure to remember what the captain had told
him about his rights and about being represented by counsel,1 26 but it
would have been even better if procedures had been in effect that
would have enabled the captain to remember what he had told
Williams about his rights. Lengthy police car "visits" with isolated
prisoners, such as occurred in Williams, should not be permitted
unless all the proceedings, both in the car and during stops along the
way, are tape recorded.
1 27
for the prosecution when it did-butthe police didn't plan itthat way. See KamisarFredE. Inbaw
"The Importance of Being Guilty," 68 J. CRM. L. & C. 182, 185 n.20 (1977) (representative
sampling of police questions). According to Biron's lawyer, Gerald M. Singer, somebody in the
police department "tipped him off" that a tape of his client's interrogation existed, he so
informed the trial judge, the judge asked a police witness about this, and the officer admitted
that this was so. Interview with Gerald M. Singer, University of Minnesota Law School (March
1962).
125. C.E. O'HARA, supra note 124, at 146-48 (first emphasis added).
126. Brief for Petitioner, Joint App. at 55, 75.
127. There would be little point in requiring all conversation in the car to be tape recorded if
the police officers were free to engage in unrecorded talks with their prisoners outside the
vehicle during various stops along the way. Thus, on extended car "visits," such as occurred in
Williams, police officers should be equipped with pocket recorders or other devices when they
and their prisoners leave the vehicle. See text accompanying note 125 supra. In the instant case,
Leaming and Nelson need only have been equipped with microphones that broadcast to the
state agents in the Bureau of Criminal Investigation car that followed their car all the way back to
Des Moines. See Brief for Petitioner, Joint App. at 66, 80. The state agents could have used
equipment in their car to record all out-of-vehicle conversations.
1977]
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True, a recording can be tampered with, but "it is doubtful that
many officers would dare tamper with [such] physical evidence [and in
any event] it could be required that the record be [promptly]
deposited with the court under seal." 128 Of course, the defendant
would have the right to cross-examine the officer testifying to its
authenticity. "The fact that it is conceivable that an agent may perjure
himself, no more makes a recording inherently unreliable and
inadmissible than any other evidence which likewise may be
fabricated."'
129
Although its need and advisability are graphically illustrated by the
gaps, inconsistencies, and confusion pervading the Williams record,
there is nothing new about this proposal. Even before the advent of
tape recordings, Roscoe Pound proposed "legal examination" of
suspects before a magistrate and "provision ... for taking down the
evidence so as to guarantee accuracy," in large measure because "it is
not the least of the abuses of the system of extralegal interrogation
that there is a constant conflict of evidence as to what the accused
said and as to the circumstances under which he said or was coerced
into saying it." 10 But tape recordings have been available for some
time now. More than twenty years ago, the author of a well-known
investigation manual pointed out: "Important interrogations [and
presumably important "visits" as well] and confessions should be
recorded."''
To aid the resolution of (and hopefully to avoid altogether) disputes
about what happened to someone in custody, the use of sound
recording devices is required by both the American Law Institute 1
2
128. Enker & Elsen, Counsel for the Suspect: Massiah v. United States and Escobedo v.
Illinois, 49 MINN. L. REV. 47, 87 (1964).
129. Brief for United States at 21 n.10, Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
130. Pound, Legal Interrogation of Persons Accused or Suspected of Crime, 24 J. CRiM. L.C. &
P.S. 1014, 1017 (1934); see Kamisar, Kauper's "Judicial Examination of the Accused" Forty
Years Later-Some Comments on a Remarkable Article, 73 MICH. L. REV. 15, 27-32 (1974)
(proposal for complete taped record of judicial examination, including information of rights, any
answer of them, and any questioning; Kauper would have recommended audio or video tape
recording of interrogations if techniques had been available when he wrote); Kauper, Judicial
Examination of the Accused-A Remedy for the Third Degree, 30 MIH. L. REV. 1224, 1240, 1248
(1932) (proposal for "prompt interrogation by magistrate supported by the threat of comment
on failure to answer" with a complete record kept of the interrogation).
131. C.E. O'HARA, FUNDAMENTALS OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION 101 (1st ed. 1956).
132. MODEL CODE. supra note 28, § 130.4 note at 39. The Model Code requires tape
recordings of the warning and waiver procedures at the police station, noting that "mandatory
recording of all casual encounters cannot be required without providing that the prisoner remain
throughout custody in a room where sound equipment is available or providing for mobile
recording units to accompany each person in custody." Id. § 130.4, Commentary at 345.
I submit, however, that if the Reporters-Draftsmen of the Model Code had anticipated a
Williams fact situation, they would have required tape recordings of the proceedings in the
240 [Vol. 66:201
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and by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws. '33 These procedures are deemed central to the Model Code's
"attempt to provide clear and enforceable rules governing the period
between arrest and judicial appearance." 134 The Court should deem
them central to its mission as well.
The Model Code procedures are designed to effectuate a suspect's
rights before the time that adversary judicial proceedings have begun.
But the case for providing clear and enforceable rules governing the
period following the initiation of judicial proceedings against a person
is still stronger. In such a case, and Williams is such a case, "the
casual and relatively perfunctory invitation to a Miranda-style waiver
is [or ought to be] insufficient." 13 5 At the very least, no claim that a
police car. A three- or four-hour secret session, albeit in a moving vehicle, with the prime
suspect-indeed, the only suspect-in a murder case is hardly a "casual encounter."
Of course, if the Model Code provisions had governed the disposition of the Williams case, it
would have been resolved in defendent's favor without ever reaching the question whether the
proceedings in the car had to be tape recorded. The Model Code "provides that once a suspect
invokes his right to remain silent or to meet with counsel"-and Williams did both several
times-"no law enforcement officer shall seek a waiver or interrogate the suspect in any way
until the suspect meets with counsel." Id. § 140.8(2)(d), Commentary at 371. But see Michigan
v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 103-05 (1975) (police may renew questioning of suspect who has
exercised his right to remain silent provided the suspect's right to cut off questioning is
scrupulously honored).
133. UNmFORM RULES OF CRMINAL PROCEDURE Rule 243 (Approved Draft 1974) ("the
information of rights, any waiver thereof, and any questioning shall be recorded upon a sound
recording device whenever feasible and in any case where questioning occurs at a place of
detention") (emphasis added).
134. MODEL CODE. supra note 28, § 130.4 note, at 39.
135. Lopez v. Zelker, 344 F. Supp. 1050, 1054 (S.D.N.Y.), affd without opinion, 465 F.2d
1405 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1049 (1972). In Lopez Judge Frankel noted that after
formal judicial proceedings have been initiated, thus
[rliveting tightly the critical right to counsel, a waiver of that right requires the
clearest and most explicit explanation and understanding of what is being given up.
There is no longer the possibility-and the law enforcement justification-that a
mere suspect may win his freedom on the spot by "clearing up a few things." Even
in the courtroom, where an impartial judicial officer is presumably impelled by no
purpose but fairness, that officer must counsel with care and advise against the
likely folly of a layman's proceeding without the aid of a lawyer. We cannot settle
for less where the waiver has been proposed by a law enforcement officer whose
goals are clearly hostile to the interests of the already indicted person in custody.
Id. at 1054; see People v. Lopez, 28 N.Y.2d 23, 28-29, 268 N.E.2d 628,631,319 N.Y.S.2d 825,
829 (Breitel, J., with Fuld, C.J., & Burke, J., dissenting) (postarraignment or postindictment
interrogation "is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but rather a form of pretrial
discovery"; "the preparation for [defendant's] trial has begun"), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 840
(1971).
The Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure provide that after the initial appearance before a
magistrate (Williams, it will be recalled, was arraigned before a judge in Davenport on the
outstanding arrest warrant, advised of his rights by the judge, and committed by him to jail), no
law enforcement officer or his agent may question a defendant "unless the defendant's lawyer
consents or is present at the questioning, or the defendant has waived counsel under Rule 711
[which is the rule for accepting a waiver at or during the trial]." UNIFORM RULES OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE rule 331 (Approved Draft 1974).
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waiver has been obtained should be accepted unless all proceedings
subsequent to the initiation of judicial proceedings have been tape
recorded.
I do not think that in the bulk of the post-Massiah, post-Miranda
cases the problem is "lying" as that word is normally used-a false
statement deliberately presented as being true, a statement meant to
deceive.' 3 6 Rather, I think it is "lying" in the sense that lawyers, poets,
and historians often "lie"-they do not "reproduce reality" but
"illumine some aspect of reality, and it always makes for deceit to
pretend that what is thus illumined is the whole of reality." '37 That is
why, not too uncommonly, when a neutral observer reads the
petitioner's statement of the case and then the respondent's-or the
majority and dissenting opinions in the case-he is compelled to
wonder whether they are talking about the same case.
What would it be like to argue a case on appeal or to hand down
opinions in such a case without any objective, reliable record-with
nothing to rest on but each lawyer's own recollection and interpreta-
tion of the critical events at the trial?'38
It is worth noting that the "Statement of the Case ' in Iowa's petition
for a writ of certiorari summarily describes the Christian burial speech
as follows: "While en route to Des Moines one of the officers
commented that the weather was beginning to turn bad and that
discovery of the body and a decent burial for the child might be delayed
by snow covering the body."' 3 9 Has something been lost in the summary
of the captain's testimony? One can demonstrate, or at least forcefully
argue, that much has-much of the tone, color, and meaning of "the
speech"-but one can do so only because how the captain described
the speech is a matter of record. What, however, if the captain had
described the speech the way the Iowa attorney general described it in
the petition for certiorari? The captain's word would have been the last
word. There would have been no place else to turn.
It is not because a police officer is more dishonest than the rest of
us that we should demand an objective recordation of the critical
136. Although I believe that Captain Leaming's original version of the Christian burial speech
is overall more damaging to the prosecution than his second version, the second is clearly more
damaging in several respects. This is strong evidence that the second time the captain testified
on the subject he was not "lying," as that term is usually defined.
137. Cohen, Field Theory and Judicial Logic, 59 YALF L.J. 238, 242 (1950).
138. This question probably understates the criminal defendant's problem by a considerable
margin. The more apt analogy would seem to be a situation where no trial transcripts are made,
but the appellate courts almost invariably adopt the government lawyer's version of what
occurred below.
139. Petition for Certiorari at 4-6.
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events. Rather, it is because we are entitled to assume that he is no
less human-no less inclined to reconstruct-and interpret past events
in a light most favorable to himself-that we should not permit him to
be "a judge of his own cause." 140
In one of his early opinions on the Supreme Court, an opinion that
undoubtedly drew upon his rich background as a trial lawyer and state
court judge,141 Justice Brennan pointed out:
To experienced lawyers it is commonplace that the
outcome of a lawsuit-and hence the vindication of legal
rights-depends more often on how the factfinder appraises
the facts than on a disputed construction of a statute or
interpretation of a line of precedents. Thus the procedures
by which the facts of the case are determined assume an
importance fully as great as the validity of the substantive
rule of law to be applied. And the more important the rights
at stake the more important must be tha procedural
safeguards surrounding those rights.
142
This theme should dominate our thinking about the confession
problem. Otherwise, decades of experience will surely have been
wasted. Otherwise, it will be of no great moment whether new stories
are added to the temples of constitutional law or old ones removed. 143
For any time an officer unimpeded by any objective record distorts,
misinterprets, or overlooks one or more critical events, the temple
may fall. For it will be a house built upon sand.
140. See Cohen, supra note 137, at 242 (maxim that no man should be judge of his own cause
derives from recognition that a person's values influence his perceptions of fact and law).
141. See Freund, William J. Brennan, Jr., 86 YALF L.J. 1015, 1016-17 (1977) (Brennan's
apprehension of substantive rights in terms of procedural variant is perhaps product of his
experience as trial lawyer and state court judge).
142. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 520-21 (1958); see Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96,
113 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (concrete procedural guidelines necessary to assure
voluntariness of statements obtained from defendant in custody).
143. Cf. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 526 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (Court is
.forever adding new stories to the temples of constitutional law and temples have a way of
collapsing when one story too many has been added) (citing Douglas v. Jeanette, 319 U.S. 151,
181 (1943) (Jackson, J., concurring in the result)).
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